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Comments on “A Practical ðt; nÞ Threshold
Proxy Signature Scheme Based on the
RSA Cryptosystem”
Guilin Wang, Feng Bao, Jianying Zhou, and
Robert H. Deng
Abstract—In a ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme, the original signer can
delegate his/her signing capability to n proxy signers such that any t or more proxy
signers can sign messages on behalf of the former, but t 1 or less of them
cannot do the same thing. Such schemes have been suggested for use in a
number of applications, particularly, in distributed computing where delegation of
rights is quite common. Based on the RSA cryptosystem, Hwang et al. [7] recently
proposed an efficient ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme. In this paper, we
identify several security weaknesses in their scheme and show that their scheme
is insecure.
Index Terms—Proxy signature, digital signature, public key cryptosystem, data
security.

1 INTRODUCTION
PROXY signatures were first introduced by Mambo et al. in [12],
[13]. Such a scheme allows one user, called original signer, to
delegate his/her signing capability to another user, called proxy
signer. After that, the proxy signer can sign messages on behalf of
the original signer. Upon receiving a proxy signature on some
message, a verifier can validate its correctness by following a given
verification procedure, and then is convinced of the original
signer’s agreement on the signed message if the validation is
positive. Proxy signature schemes have been suggested for use in a
number of applications, including e-cash systems, mobile agents,
mobile communications, grid computing, global distribution net-
works, and distributed shared object systems, etc., [1], [24].
Based on the ideas of secret sharing [21], [15], [16] and threshold
cryptosystems [2], Zhang and Kim et al. independently con-
structed the first threshold proxy signatures in [25] and [8],
respectively. In a ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme, the
original signer’s signing power is delegated to a group of n proxy
singers such that t or more of them can generate proxy signatures
cooperatively, but t 1 or less of them cannot do the same thing.
This technology not only allows the original signer to delegate the
proxy signing power to a group of proxy signers instead of one
single proxy signer, but also lets the original signer set the
threshold value t freely (1  t  n). Therefore, the threshold proxy
signature approach is more practical, flexible, and secure than
standard proxy signature schemes.
A practical and secure ðt; nÞ threshold proxy signature scheme
should satisfy the following six requirements [7]:
. Secrecy. The original signer’s private key cannot be derived
from any information, such as the shares of the proxy
signing key, proxy signatures, etc. Particularly, even if all
proxy signers collude together, they cannot derive the
original signer’s private key.
. Proxy Protection. Only the delegated proxy signer can
generate valid partial proxy signatures. Even the original
signer cannot masquerade as a proxy signer to create
partial signatures.
. Unforgeability. A valid proxy signature can only be
cooperatively generated by t or more proxy signers. This
means that valid proxy signatures cannot be created by
ðt 1Þ or less proxy signers, or any third parties who are
not designated as proxy signers.
. Nonrepudiation. Any valid proxy signature must be
generated by t or more proxy signers. Therefore, proxy
signers cannot deny that they have signed the message. In
addition, the original signer cannot deny having delegated
the power of signing messages to the proxy signers.
. Time Constraint. The proxy signing keys can be used during
the delegated period only. Once they expire, the proxy
signatures generated by using those keys become invalid.
. Known signers. For internal auditing purposes, the system
is able to identify the actual signers of a given threshold
proxy signature.
Following the first threshold proxy signatures in [8], [25], a
number of improvements and new schemes have been proposed
[18], [19], [6], [5], [23]. However, most of them do not meet all the
above security requirements. At the same time, all these schemes
are based on the discrete logarithm cryptosystems [4], [20]. The
main reason is that it is difficult to share the private key of the RSA
cryptosystem [17] among multiple parties. The RSA cryptosystem
is now the de facto industrial standard and is widely used in many
applications; therefore, it is highly desirable to construct threshold
proxy signature schemes based on the RSA cryptosystem. Hwang
et al. recently proposed an RSA-based ðt; nÞ threshold proxy
signature scheme in [7]. This scheme is dramatically more efficient
than previous schemes in both computation and communication
because it does not exploit the distributed random number
generation protocol proposed in [15], [16]. For example, after a
detailed performance analysis, Hwang et al. concluded that their
scheme only requires 5 percent computation overheads and
8 percent communication overheads of Kim et al.’s scheme [8].
Unfortunately, as we will show shortly, the scheme is not secure.
Though Hwang et al. claimed that their scheme satisfies all the
security requirements listed above, our analysis indicates that the
scheme fails to satisfy all the requirements except the one on time
constraint. For simplicity, we call their scheme the HLL scheme
hereafter. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: We review
the HLL scheme in Section 2 and present our analysis in Section 3.
Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 4.
2 REVIEW OF THE HLL SCHEME
In the HLL scheme [7], the following notations are used. The
original signer is denoted by P0 and the n proxy signers are
denoted by Pi ði ¼ 1; 2;    ; nÞ. For i ¼ 0; 1;    ; n, Ni denotes Pi’s
RSA modulus, and ðei; diÞ represents Pi’s public/private key pair,
where Ni is the product of two large primes pi and qi,
diei ¼ 1 mod ðNiÞ, and ðNiÞ ¼ ðpi  1Þðqi  1Þ. In addition, the
message mw stands for a warrant, which specifies the validity
period of the proxy key, the identities of the original signer and
proxy signers, the kind of messages being delegated, etc.
2.1 The Proxy Sharing Phase
1. Proxy Generation. The original signer P0 generates the
group proxy signing key D and the corresponding proxy
verification key E as follows:
D ¼ dmw0 mod ðN0Þ; ð1Þ
E ¼ emw0 mod ðN0Þ: ð2Þ
Then, P0 publishes fmw;E; ½mwjjEd0 modN0g.
2. Proxy Sharing. P0 selects a random secret polynomial fðXÞ
of degree ðt 1Þ in the form
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fðXÞ ¼ Dþ a1X þ    þ at1Xt1 mod ðN0Þ; ð3Þ
where a1; a2;    ; at1 are random numbers. Then, P0
computes Pi’s partial proxy signing key ki ¼ fðiÞ, and
sends ½½kid0 modN0jjkiei modNi to the proxy signer Pi,
where i represents Pi’s identity.
3. Proxy Share Generation. When each proxy signer Pi receives
½½kid0 modN0jjkiei modNi, he decrypts the ciphertext to
obtain f½kid0 modN0; kig. Then, the proxy signer Pi
confirms the validity of ki and keeps it secret.
2.2 The Proxy Signature Issuing Phase
Let T denote a subset of t or more proxy signers who want to
cooperatively generate a proxy signature on a message M on
behalf of P0. For this sake, they perform the following operations:
1. With the partial proxy signing key ki, each Pi, i 2 T ,
generates his partial proxy signature si on message M as
si ¼MLiki modN0; ð4Þ
where the Lagrange interpolating coefficient Li is given by
Li ¼
Y
j2T;j 6¼i
j
i j : ð5Þ
Then, each Pi (i 2 T ) sends f½sidi modNi; sig to the
combiner.
2. The combiner verifies si using the public key of Pi and
stores ½sidi modNi. If all the partial proxy signatures are
valid, the combiner generates the proxy signature S on
message M using the following equation:
S ¼
Y
i2T
si modN0
¼M
P
i2T LifðiÞ modN0
¼Mfð0Þ modN0
¼MD modN0:
ð6Þ
2.3 The Proxy Signature Verification Phase
Using the publicly known parameters Ni; ei;mw and E, any
receiver can validate a proxy signature S with the following
verification procedure:
1. The verifier first computes mw and E with the original
signer’s public key. Then, the stipulated delegation period
is checked. If the period has expired, the proxy verification
key is invalid.
2. The verifier then checks the validity of proxy signature S
by the following equation:
SE modN0 ¼ ðMDÞE modN0
¼Mdmw0 emw0 modN0
¼M modN0:
ð7Þ
3. For internal auditing purpose, the original signer can
differentiate the actual signers from the signatures
½sidi modNi on message si, where i 2 T .
3 COMMENTS ON THE HLL SCHEME
In [7], Hwang et al. provided a detailed security discussion on their
scheme and claimed that their scheme meets all the security
requirements listed in Section 1. Actually, their scheme is insecure.
In this section, we point out some security weaknesses in the HLL
scheme.
3.1 Security
1. Secrecy. Hwang et al. claimed that their scheme meets
secrecy, i.e., even t or all proxy signers collude together,
they cannot recover the original signer’s private key.
They argued that, though t or more proxy signers can
get the proxy signing key D, they cannot derive the
original signer’s private key d0 from the equation
D ¼ dmw0 mod ðN0Þ, since the values of d0 and ðN0Þ
are not known to them. However, this is not the fact.
We explain the details as follows: First, for any subset
T  f1; 2;    ; ng satisfying jT j  t, (6) implies that the
following equation holds:
D ¼
X
i2T
Li  ki: ð8Þ
In other words, any t or more colluding proxy signers
can get the proxy signing key D by (8). Second, since
E ¼ emw0 mod ðN0Þ and e0d0 ¼ 1 mod ðN0Þ, we have
ED ¼ 1 mod ðN0Þ. This means that ED 1 is a
nonzero multiple of ðN0Þ. However, it is well-known
that knowing such multiple of ðN0Þ is equivalent to
factoring N0 (e.g., [9, p. 91]). Finally, with the factors
of N0, the proxy singers can compute the value of
ðN0Þ, and then get the value of d0 easily from the
equation d0e0 ¼ 1 mod ðN0Þ by using the extended
Euclidean algorithm. Therefore, the result is that the
original signer’s private key d0 is revealed to proxy
signers.1
2. Proxy Protection. Since the original signer P0 knows all
the partial proxy signing keys, i.e, kis, P0 can generate
partial proxy signatures on any message M by comput-
ing si ¼MLiki modN0. However, P0 cannot generate the
corresponding signature for si on behalf of Pi since P0
does not know Pi’s private key di. Therefore, the authors
of [7] concluded that in the HLL scheme, even the
original signer cannot generate valid proxy signatures to
frame the proxy signers. We note that the combiner in
the system is just a role for enhancing efficiency and
internal audit. Furthermore, each proxy signer’s signa-
ture sdii modNi is not included in the proxy signature.
Hence, a verifier accepts a threshold proxy signature S
just by checking whether it satisfies (7). This means that
with the knowledge of the group proxy private key D,
the original signer P0 can generate valid threshold proxy
signature on any message M of its choice by directly
computing S ¼MD modN0.
Moreover, we remark that the protocol of proxy sharing
in the HLL scheme is different from the standard ones [12],
[8], [10], [11]. In general, the following two properties
should be satisfied by the proxy signing key generation
protocol of (threshold) proxy signatures: 1) A valid proxy
signing key can only be generated by the original signer
and proxy signers jointly and 2) each proxy signer knows
the (partial) signing key, but the original singer does not
know it. Based on these two properties, a proxy signature
scheme can be guaranteed to meet the security require-
ment of proxy protection, unforgeability, and nonrepudia-
tion. In the HLL scheme, however, the partial proxy
signing key ki is just a share of D created by the original
signer alone and not bound to the private key di of the
proxy signer Pi. Therefore, the original signer can forge a
new warrant mw without the agreements of all the proxy
signers, and then calculate the corresponding group proxy
signing key D and verification key E. Then, as we
mentioned above, using the value of D, the original proxy
signer can generate valid threshold proxy signatures in the
names of proxy signers. Upon receiving such a proxy
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break an RSA-based optimistic fair exchange protocol proposed in [14]. In
addition, the well-known fact that an RSA modulus cannot be shared
among different users is also due to this algorithm.
signature, a verifier will accept it and be convinced that it
is signed by some proxy signers.
3. Nonrepudiation. In fact, to generate a proxy signature, any
proxy signer can play the role of the combiner. This
implies that if t proxy singers collude, they can generate a
proxy signature in the same way but without the help of
the designated combiner. At the same time, as we
mentioned above, the original signer can also generate
valid threshold proxy signatures directly by using the
group proxy signing keyD. Therefore, the combiner can be
surpassed by the original signer and the proxy signers.
Consequently, when such valid threshold proxy signatures
are presented in future disputes, who should take
responsibility for them? Since in the database of the
combiner there are no records of proxy signers’ partital
and individual signatures corresponding to them, either
the original singer or the proxy signers can deny having
signed them. So, we conclude that the HLL scheme does
not meet the security requirement of nonrepudiation.
4. Known Signer. Even for internal auditing, the combiner
should be trusted by all proxy singers and the original
signer; otherwise, a proxy singer’s standard signature sdii
modNi on si can be altered, replaced, or deleted by the
combiner. The point is that we cannot assume that the
combiner is a trusted party because of the following two
reasons. On the one hand, maintaining such a trusted
party is very costly in the real world. On the other hand,
such an assumption is contrary to the original motiva-
tion of reducing the original signer’s trust on individual
proxy signers. If the combiner is a trusted party, why
not just treat the combiner as a single proxy signer
instead of exploiting threshold schemes? Therefore, the
combiner has only limited merit for supporting the
security of the HLL scheme.
5. Unforgeability. Moreover, using the similar strategy as
mentioned above, it is even possible for an outsider to
mount a universal forgery attack. The reason is that E, e0,
mw are publicly known values, so e
mw
0 can be computed in
the integer ring Z by anyone. Equation (2) implies that
emw0  E is also a multiple of ðN0Þ. Therefore, an outsider
can also factor the original signer’s RSA modulus N0.
However, we have to note that this attack may be
significantly time consuming than that by proxy signers
because the integer emw0 is much larger than ED.
3.2 Correctness
We now point out a problem on the correctness of the HLL scheme.
That is, if some coefficients Lis defined by (5) are not integers, (6)
does not hold. The original authors noticed this problem, so it is
required that Li 2 Z (see the second line on page 1,555 [7]).
However, according to the description of the HLL scheme,
i; j 2 f1; 2;    ; ng. In this setting, Lis are not necessarily integers.
To overcome this problem, one approach is to set the identity of
user i as a specific integer IDi, instead of integer i. For example, we
can set IDi ¼ n!þ i 1. In such scenario, it is not difficult to know
that all coefficients Lis are indeed integers. However, Lis become
huge integers if the group size n is big (e.g, n ¼ 100). A similar but
more practical approach is introduced by Shoup in [22]. But, we do
not provide details about those techniques since the above
identified security weaknesses still remain.
In addition, when a verifier validates a threshold proxy
signature, he does not need to compute mw and E since they
are public parameters. What he needs to do is to check whether
ðmw;EÞ is a valid pair of warrant and proxy public key certified
by the original signer. To this end, he checks whether
mwjjE  ð½mwjjEd0 modN0Þe0 modN0. If this equality holds, the
verifier accepts E as a valid proxy public key, and uses it to
check the validity of a proxy signature according to (7).
4 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a security analysis of the threshold
proxy signature scheme proposed recently in [7]. Our results show
that this scheme is insecure, which is contrary to the original
authors’ conclusion. We remark that it is still an open problem to
construct efficient and secure RSA-based threshold proxy signa-
ture schemes.
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